The Cold War 1947 to Present Day: Did the United States really win?

The Cold War was a protracted struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States that occurred from 1945 to 1991. The term Cold War characterized an ideological conflict not only between the Soviet Union and the US but the globe. Cold War was punctuated by unconventional and conventional military, the ideological and economical confrontation between the USSR and her proxies on one hand, and the US and her proxies on another hand. After the end of the World War Two, increasingly divergent ideologies created rights between the USSR and the US who had once been allies. Consequently, the two countries began to build up their zones of influence, partitioning the world into two opposing camps. Starting 1947 onwards, the USSR and the US, using all the resources and means at their disposal for subversion and intimidation, clashed in a protracted ideological conflict marked by crises. The Cold War came to an end with the collapse of the USSR in 1991. In thinking about the conclusion of the Cold War, historians have debated and offered different reasons for its end. Western historians who believe that US won the Cold War cite American military and economic superiority that pushed the Soviet into bankruptcy.  They argue that aggressive increases in military spending sent the Soviet empire into bankrupt as it struggle for a response. Other experts attribute the conclusion of the conflict to the Soviet’s internal weakness.[1] While it is true that the US prevailed in the end, it is internal weaknesses such as Soviet deteriorating economy and decline of communist ideology that led to the end of Cold War.

Cold War Historiography

Tracing the genesis of the Cold War is a phenomenal task for scholars. This is because the two major protagonists involved in the war have presented competing narratives to serve their post-Cold War political objectives. The writings on the historiography of the origins of the Cold War are dominated by three major schools of thought. There are revisionists, post-orthodox, and post-revisionist.

Orthodox views emerged among Western historians in the 1950s such as Thomas Bailey, Louis Halle, Arthur Schlesinger, and Herbert Feis. These historians attribute the origins of the Cold War to Soviet aggression, Stalin personality, and Marxism-Leninism.[2] According to orthodox historians, the Soviet regime started the Cold War by seeking to spread ideological evangelism and Soviet imperialism cross Asia and Europe.[3] Proof of the Soviet’s expansionist intentions could be seen in the unilateral moves by the regime to establish communist governments in Eastern Europe and China, and efforts to cause instability in the Near East.[4] Thomas Bailey argued that Joseph Stalin deliberately violated the agreements reached at Potsdam and Yalta in order to spread Soviet Communism throughout the globe.[5] His duplicitous behavior resulted in the breakdown of the Wartime Alliance and commencement of the Cold War. In the eyes of Orthodox historians, the US, on the other hand, was seen as defensive and passive immediate after the war ended. The US wanted nothing more than post-wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union, and to promote an international order centered on self-determination and freedom.[6] The Orthodox historians argue that the US had only reactive role in the developments. The US and its leaders sought no expansionism but a post-war working relationship. The US had to act in defense of democracy and self-determination by settling on a policy of containing Soviet expansionism when the Soviet violated the agreement of Yalta Conference. Thus the central argument in much of the Orthodox school of thought was an ideological one: America, faced by an hostile enemy for which no measure of conciliation could meet its international ambitions, acted in defense of democracy, saving  and self-determination, saving the world from communist expansionism.[7] The Orthodox interpretation gained prominence because it aligned with the US interests, justifying American policies such as the Truman Doctrine.

In the 1960s, another school of thought emerged, namely Revisionism. In contrast to the Orthodox view that considered the American foreign policy to be various and benevolent, revisionist scholars saw purpose and pursuit of national self-interest in the American policy. The Soviet was simply reacting to America’s assertive foreign policy or imperialism. Thus the Revisionist interpretation put blame on the US for the Cold War.  In the post-WW2, the US foreign policy was driven by national self-interest and economic consideration as opposed to self-determination and democracy. William Williams saw American policy as advancing economic imperialism. According to Williams, the open-door policy advanced by America was the genesis of the conflict.[8]  However, the Revisionists differ among themselves on a number of issues. The so called moderate Revisionists put more blame on individuals than they do on American systems and institutions. Here, the personality of Franklin Roosevelt and Truman come into play. Franklin Roosevelt trusted the Soviet and Stalin and sought to forge a continuing working relationship to maintain peace. Roosevelt believed forming the United Nations could offer an opportunity for wartime allies to continue cooperating to maintain world peace. On the other hand, Truman adopted hardliner approach toward the Soviet regime that he violated functioning coalition immediately after assuming office.[9] Truman showed less commitment to the idea of continued working together with the Soviet.  He believed “unless Russia is faced with an iron feast and string language another war is in the making.”[10] Furthermore, Truman surrounded himself with fanatically anti-Soviet advisors such as Kennan and Clifford. The hard Revisionist historians raise fundamental issues concerning the American system that evolved over the years. America pursued a policy of containing Communism in continental Europe to secure markets and investment for herself. American policymakers wanted Europe to be full of capitalist nations that are open to American exports and free trade. The proof of this objective included policies such as the Marshall Plan, post-war loans, and lend-lease. The Revisionist historians saw security concerns at the core of the Soviet foreign policy. To that end, the Revisionists placed responsibility on the US for the onset of the Cold War. Cold War revisionism involved the works of Gar Alperovitz, Gabriel Kolko, and William Appleman.[11]

The debate over the Cold War origins between the revisionist and orthodox historians grew hostile. By holding the US chiefly responsible for the origins of the Cold War, seeing America’s own expansionist ambitions and denying Soviet immorality as a chief cause of the war, revisionist historians subverted the moral distinctions which had informed the US foreign policy.[12] In the 1970s, the debate dissipated, creating way for another school of thought called post-revisionist. While still studying the military and diplomatic facets of the conflict, experts began to see the conflict as a product of an intricate interaction between involved parties. Most post-Revisionists downplayed the role of ideologies and ideas and instead took a realist approach to explain the Cold War origins. They argued that decision makers on both sides became rational political calculators, promoting their respective national self-interests in the distinct milieu of post-war world.  The post-Revisionist interpretation places less emphasis on blame throwing and focuses more on the interplay of several intertwining factors.[13] Post-revisionists such as John Daddis explained that the complicated interaction of internal and external influences both in the Soviet and the US played a major role the origins of the Cold War.[14] Internal influences such as fear of communism, the ideal of freedom and self-determination, the illusion of omnipotence promoted by US atomic bomb in the US, along with the search for security, postwar reconstruction needs, the role of ideology and Stalin’s personality in the Soviet made the resulting conflict hostile one.[15] The US policymaking’s strategic dimensions, perceptions of threat, and vital security interests characterized the post-revisionist interpretation. America feared that the Soviet would take advantage of the devastation created by World War Two advance its influence into the power vacuum left following the defeat of the Axis powers. Policymakers in Washington believed that the Soviet influence in Europe would pose a threat to Western interests.[16]

Did the US Win the Cold War?

Contrary to the narrative fronted by the conservatives in America, the US did not win the Cold War. The US did not win or end the Cold War through its military deterrence and geopolitical containment as historians want us to believe. Rather the conflict came to an end when a crop of new leaders in Russia realized how outdated and badly their system had failed. Lebow and Stein argued that Reagan’s tough stance and policies served only to delay rather than hasten the conclusion of the Cold War. Instead, it is the internal factors within the Soviet Union contributed to the conclusion of the Cold War.

American conservatives believed that it was the tough stance Reagan administration adopted toward the Soviet Union that brought about the collapse of communism. It is argued that flourishing economy in the 1980s enabled the US to aggressively increase its defense budget for the nuclear arms. Because of its failing economy, the Soviet could not keep up with the cost of the new arms race without going bankrupt. For instance, the Reagan Administration initiated the Star War program, which enabled the US to deploy satellites that can track and destroy nuclear intercontinental missiles of foes. The Soviet responded by doubling its defense spending thereby stretching its resources. The Star War contributed to the worsening of the Soviet economy, as the country was unable to simultaneously compete with the US military spending and provide for its citizens. However, there is no proof of significant change in Russian military spending in the 1980s. Instead, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 could be attributed to its internal weakness, such as failing economy. The narrative that increases in the US military spending caused the Soviet to collapse is far from the truth. Conservative historians believe that the massive military spending by the Reagan administration in programs such as Star Wars and the Strategic Defense Initiative engineered the conclusion of the conflict. This narrative is reinforced further by Reagan’s visit to the Berlin Wall in 1987 where he told Gorbachev to tear it down. Because this came to pass, many people developed wrong impression that the US helped end the conflict. The truth of the matter is that the Soviet Union was facing economic deterioration well before Reagan came to power.  Economic reforms were required to survive. In fact, the end of the Cold War came as a surprise to Western political leaders, the public, and experts.

Soviet economic weakness compared to the US and the West is often cited as the reason for the end of the Cold War.[17] It is argued that the Soviet was presented with two options by the West: compete in the arms race or negotiate.  Because the Soviet could not compete with the US on arms race financially, it chose to negotiate reductions in nuclear arms. This saw Gorbachev signing the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). This afforded Gorbachev the funds to implement reforms in the country. Far from the policies of the US, the conflict came to an end due to growing economic deterioration of the Soviet, personality and policies of Gorbachev, and the collapse of communism in the Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Collapse of Communism

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the fall of Berlin wall led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet had imposed communist regimes in eastern European countries. Soviet troops could be sent into those countries to maintain communism. However, opposition to communist rule started to mount in Eastern Europe, starting with Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1980s. The widespread opposition grew stronger for the Soviet Union to intervene and control.  Gorbachev renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine that pledge to employ force to safeguard Soviet interests in Eastern Europe.[18] As a result, the Soviet reached a decision not to intervene and contain these independent movements by restraining not to use force. Beginning with Poland in 1989, Solidarity won the elections replacing the communist regime. Following the example of Poland, other former satellite nations replaced communist governments with democratically elected governments.

By loosening governmental power, Gorbachev created a domino effect wherein Eastern European coalitions started to crumble, encouraging nations like Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania to proclaim their independence. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to the formal unification of West Germany and East Germany following the tearing down of the wall, citizens in Roman, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria staged demonstrations and protests against their respective communist governments, a move that hasten the end of communist governments across the Soviet bloc.[19] By 1990, democratically elected governments had replaced formerly communist officials, laying the ground for the reintegration of the Eastern European into Western political and economic spheres.

Economic Disadvantage

Gorbachev ascended to power in 1985, inheriting an economy that had been stagnant for nearly two decades. The political and economic structure was already in decay when Gorbachev took over. By the 1960s, the Soviet growth rate had slowed before falling sharply in the 1980s.[20] Because the Soviet performed extremely well in the production of military equipment and heavy industry, it did survive long enough before the economy started crumbling. In addition, it had vast amounts of natural gas and oil reserves to sustain itself.

The economy was in bad shape requiring urgent reform. High oil prices had inspired soviet planners to put more investments in oil production infrastructure with the hope that the price will continue increasing. Oil exports accounted for 80% of its hard currency earning. Because the Soviet relied heavily on a large raw material and energy base, it disregarded foreign trade. The Soviet economy depended on a central system in which the government controlled every source of agricultural and industrial production. Structural weakness of the command economy that depended on rigid central planning tended to favor gross output of goods over productivity. The center influenced the kind of goods to be produced instead of allowing the market forces of demand and supply to run smoothly. As a result, the center gave priority to heavy industry, transport, and construction at the expense of consumer needs.[21] Shortages of consumer goods, inflation, and declining harvest caused social unrest and protests in the country. Lack of consumer goods caused discontentment among the citizens

Failure of Gorbachev’s Reforms

Gorbachev embarked on economic restructuring (perestroika) and speaking openly (glasnost) to address the crumbling economy. Gorbachev sought to implement his political and economic reforms by involving public participation of the Soviet people. Gorbachev sought to adopt mixed communist-capitalist economic system in which the government would plan the direction the economy takes while allowing market forces to influence certain decisions. Economic restructuring transferred state-owned economy to private ownership thereby creating opening up a free-market economy. But Perestroika failed to improve the economy by causing more harm than good. Widespread problems such as food shortages and poverty plagued the Soviet Union. In addition, Gorbachev’s political reforms to democratize met steep opposition from many established members of the Communist party.[22] These members opposed efforts by Gorbachev to reduce party control of the government apparatus.

The policy of glasnost aimed at gaining public support for his reforms. Openness allowed greater freedom of expression and criticism of Soviet policies. However, once restrictions on freedom of speech and mass media were loosened, it become impossible to control public opinion.[23] Freedom of expression set the stage for the collapse of the Soviet. The openness coincided with the time when economic reforms were starting to negatively affect the material living standards of Soviet citizens. Glasnost encouraged people to point out the shortcomings of the economic reforms and stage protests.

Conclusion

The US did not win or help end the Cold War. In fact, its geopolitical containment policies and military deterrence only delayed the end of the conflict. Rather, it is the internal factors in the Soviet Union that led to the collapse of communism. These factors include worsening economic conditions, unpopular economic and political reforms by Gorbachev, crumbling of communism in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is true that the US prevailed at the end of the day but external pressure played minimal role in the collapse of communism. The collapse was sudden that even the West was surprised.

Bibliography

Bailey, Thomas A. America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations From Early Times to Our Day. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1951

Brown, Archie. The Gorbachev revolution and the end of the Cold War’, in Leffler, M., Westad, O. (eds.) The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 3. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010

Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry. Who Won the Cold War?  Foreign Policy, 87 (1992), 123-128

Falode, Adewunmi James and Yakubu, Moses.  A New Historiography of the Origins of the Cold War (July 31, 2019). Soshum Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 9. 2(2019), 100-111,

Feis, Herbert. Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The Wars They Waged and the Peace They Sought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Forsberg, Tuomas. Economic incentives, ideas, and the end of the Cold War: Gorbachev and German Unification. Journal of Cold War Studies 7.2 (2005), 142-164.

Gaddis, John Lewis. The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War. Diplomatic History 7.3 (1983), 171-190

Llewellyn, Jennifer and Steve Thompson. Cold War historiography. Alpha History. https://alphahistory.com/coldwar/cold-war-historiography/

McNeil, William H. America, Britain and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-46. London: Oxford University Press, 1953.

Prados, John. How the Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011.

Sakwa, Richard. Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985-1990. New York: Phillip Allan, 1990.

Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. Origins of the Cold War. Foreign Affairs 46 (1967), 22-52

Thomas Archie. America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations From Early Times to Our Day. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1951.

Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon. The Origins of the Cold War. Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1991.

Williams, William A. The tragedy of American diplomacy. New York, 1962

Zubok, Vladislav M. Why Did the Cold War End in 1989? Explanations of “The Turn”’ in Westad, O. (ed.) Reviewing the Cold War. London: Frank Cass, 2000.

[1] Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry. Who Won the Cold War?  Foreign Policy, 87 (1992), 123-128

[2] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, ‘Origins of the Cold War’, Foreign Affairs, (1967), 49−50

[3] Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The Wars They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967),45

[4] William H. McNeil, America, Britain and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-46 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 609

[5] Thomas A. America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations From Early Times to Our Day (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1951)

[6] William H. McNeil, America, Britain and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-46 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 612

[7] Arthur Schlesinger Jr., ‘Origins of the Cold War’, Foreign Affairs 46 (1967)23

[8] William A. Williams, The tragedy of American diplomacy, (New York, 1962), 206

[9] Llewellyn, Jennifer and Steve Thompson, Cold War historiography. Alpha History. https://alphahistory.com/coldwar/cold-war-historiography/

[10] Extract from a letter from President Truman to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes

[11] William A. Williams, The tragedy of American diplomacy (New York, 1962), 206

[12] Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1991), xxi.

[13] John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War’, Diplomatic History 7.3 (1983), 171-190

[14] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press 2000), p.361

[15] Gaddis ibid, pp.361

[16] Gaddis ibid, pp.361

[17] Tuomas Forsberg, Economic incentives, ideas, and the end of the Cold War: Gorbachev and German Unification, Journal of Cold War Studies 7.2 (2005), 142-164.

[18] Vladislav M Zubok, ‘Why Did the Cold War End in 1989? Explanations of “The Turn”’ in Westad, O. (ed.) Reviewing the Cold War (London: Frank Cass, 2000): 348

[19] Archie Brown, The Gorbachev revolution and the end of the Cold War’, in Leffler, M., Westad, O. (eds.) The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 3 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 252

[20] Brown, ibid pp. 248

[21] John Prados, How the Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011), 106

[22] Prados, ibid, 39

[23] Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985-1990 (New York: Phillip Allan, 1990): 66