Assessment of The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Counter Terrorism Program

Introduction

Following the events of the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) instituted an array of reforms aimed at transforming the agency from a mainly reactive enforcement body to focused on conducting criminal investigations into a more agile, flexible, mobile as well as intelligence based criminal justice body capable of preventing terrorists attacks.  The 9/11 attack was blamed on major intelligence failures only comparable to those associated with Pearl Harbor attack (Odom, 2003).

The Federal Bureau of Investigations acts in the capacity of the federal principal agency charged with the responsibility of responding to as well as investigating terrorism. Since the 2001 attack, the U.S Attorney General in collaboration with FBI’s director has increased counterterrorism efforts with a view to preventing future attacks. Based on this mandate, this exercise will seek to assess the effectiveness of the agency by examining different aspects relating to its management of resources used to drive the counterterrorism program since 2001.

This assessment will rely on the Goal Assessment model to assess the FBI’s organizational effectiveness as a critical facet of the Criminal Justice System. This model represents one of the most common theoretical standpoints on effectiveness as it is both a simple as well as complex approach. In its most basic application, the Goal Model aims to define effectiveness in terms of the extent to which organizations achieve their. It thus posits that an organization can only be understood as a rational entity. Through this model, an assessment of organizational effectiveness assumes that the goals defining the workings of a particular organization are identifiable, the organization is motivated to realize them; and the progress towards effectiveness can be quantified (Stojkovic, Kalinich, & Klofas, 2015).

Threat Assessment

The incessant treat posed by terrorists has thrust domestic preparedness into the principle agenda of the FBI. For the agency, this means that the ability to assess as well as manage different risks in this regard is critical. In light of the events that followed the 9/11 happenings, the ability of the FBI to effectively realize the goals within its counterterrorism program must be viewed as important as criminal intelligence, crime analysis and prevention. The ramifications for failing to conduct assessment and adequate management of threats posed by terrorism and associated risks can indeed be incalculable (Rabkin, 2012).

Towards this end, the agency does not have a comprehensive transcribed assessment the threats the United Sates faces in regards to the terrorism. The importance of a concise albeit comprehensive threat assessment cannot be overstated as it and as such, an assessment of the effectiveness of the agency’s threat assessment criteria is extremely useful to defining the nature, likelihood in addition to the severity posed by these acts going forward.  Although the FBI has incorporated tremendous efforts into developing an written and comprehensive risk assessment as evidenced by its “FBI Report on the Terrorist Threat to the United States and a Strategy for Prevention and Response report” , the assessment does not adequately address current and emerging issues as the report was largely predicated on res[ponding to security deficiencies that led to the 9/11 attacks (Rabkin, 2012).

An assessment of this document reveals that that the guidelines contained in the report do not in any way conform to conform to agency’s assessment guidelines as well as other guidelines developed by the Criminal Justice Department in regards to developing a threat and risk assessment. The report developed in 2001 after a terrorist attack was supposed to be the blueprint for continuous risk assessment contingent upon an understanding of current and emerging threats but it is underlined by glaring discrepancies in terms of training, resources, skill level, specific capabilities, sophistication, likelihood and intent of terrorist assemblages. In addition the report does not provide and explain the techniques terrorism could use in future. For instance, it is silent on the analysis of progress made by terrorists to develop or else gain access to a biological, chemical or nuclear weapon or any record of evidence collected in previous investigations (Odom, 2003).

In an effort to improve the analytical capability of the agency, the Director in 2002 established the Intelligence Office under the command of experienced intelligence professionals.  This should obviously enhance its aptitude to collate, analyze, as well as convey information relevant to threat levels. It is thus obvious that the agency has realized this goal to a relatively significant degree by recognizing it inabilities to conduct adequate analysis of intelligence with respect to support human resources and its abilities. Based on the goal assessment, this submission concludes that that the agency has made significant gains to this extent and  but it lacks the requisite numbers to scrutinize intelligence and defined career paths among, experience, training standards, or effective deployment systems and leveraging analysts to examine precedence threats at both the strategic and tactical scale (Svendsen, 2015).

Strategic Planning

For the last decade, the FBI has invested significant resources in developing an intricate, multi-layered premeditated planning system (Svendsen, 2015). However, while the system does indeed acknowledge an overall threat to the country, the agency does not conduct as well as integrate a broad assessment of different risks and threats into the strategic plan. Similarly, there are different weaknesses and vulnerabilities its capability to address the overall threat.

By reworking its strategic planning processes, the Federal Bureau of Investigations has developed a clear goals as well as objectives coupled with the necessary flexibility needed to enable it to adjust in a timely manner to dynamic threats. This has in turn transformed its goals in addition to objectives into measurable and actionable activities capable at tracking progress of the realization of respective goals. Further, the enhanced planning process has developed performance targets in addition to measures that have incrementally allowed the organization’s goals through comprehensive evaluations and timely implementation of recommendations.

Intelligence Reforms

            The agency is currently responding to various shortcomings by increasing efforts aimed at transforming the FBI into an organization capable of preventing terrorist attacks as opposed to a reactionary agency to criminal activities. The principal aspect of these efforts is the reformation as well as enhancements to of various units created to provide support to intelligence gathering and dissemination. These reforms are aimed at transforming the agency into a proper and incorporated intelligence-based unit. These will include but not limited to the adoption of fresh operational practices as well as the upgrade of its Information Technology capabilities (Rabkin, 2012).

Through these reforms, the FBI has managed to address numerous challenges. To begin with, the agency has improved its focus on domestic threats as it is now capable of identifying as well as monitoring the extent of activities by different terrorist groups operating within the country. Secondly, the agency is now in a position to undertake all-source analysis. Abandoning the conventional overreliance on belligerent, case-oriented approach has encouraged the wider collection as well as analysis undertakings that are crucial to the intelligence goal.  In addition, the agency has effectively centralized nationally-coordinated effort aimed at gaining actionable intelligence (Odom, 2003).  In this regard, filed offices now enjoy wider latitude in regards to managing different activities, in a manner consistent with the changing as well as reactive nature in regards to of its conventional law enforcement mandate.  Currently, the intelligence reforms have allowed the FBI a significant flexibility that has in turn enabled it to widen its scope to cover contemporary threats. Finally, the Federal Bureau of Investigations has effectively realized the goal of conducting strategic analysis of counterterrorism.

However, this ability may be curtailed by the obvious disparities in its threat assessment capabilities as witnessed during the 9/11 attacks. Following the events of the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) instituted an array of reforms aimed at transforming the agency from a mainly reactive enforcement body to focused on conducting criminal investigations into a more agile, flexible, mobile as well as intelligence based criminal justice body capable of preventing terrorists attacks.  The 9/11 attack was blamed on major intelligence failures only comparable to those associated with Pearl Harbor attack (Odom, 2003).  This scenario could be replicated in modern times if the agency does not base future intelligence reforms on the a properly developed threat assessment process.

Resources

            The organization has dedicated significant resources to the counterterrorism program as well as associated counterintelligence measures.  These resources have  increased exponentially since the 9/11 attacks compared to previous periods. The agency has in this regard implemented different approaches to ensure they are used prudently. The agency has in this regard developed an elaborate budget implementation system that basically tracks expenditure within from an organizational perspective. As a result, the organization is now in a position to readily establish expenditure in a real-time manner in regards to the counterterrorism program.  This system also allows it to determine with precision the amount of time charged to field agents involved in counterterrorism investigations (Stojkovic, Kalinich, & Klofas, 2015).

New Priorities

Based on the dynamic nature of terrorists threat faced by the country on a continuous basis, the FBI must implement new priorities. In line with these goal, the agency has reduced the inherent flexibility in it’s the former three-tiered system. These changes especially realte to resource allocation where as opposed to giving field officers the latitude to a1llocate funds within wide priority areas, the agency has adopted a new system that stipulates that managers must satisfy operational requirements within an established strict scale of priority.  To achieve this goal, the agency has effectively adopted new measures aimed at communicating the importance of implementing priorities (Svendsen, 2015).

Communication relevant to this goal has been successful to the greatest extent as the success of the counterintelligence program is predicated upon a universal commitment to implementing new priorities.  The organization has embarked a detailed education campaign.  These initiatives have been effective in enhancing the capacity of field officers to deploy resources in a timely manner when addressing counterterrorism issues (Stojkovic, Kalinich, & Klofas, 2015).

It is however sufficient to note that the effectiveness of this approach depends on the agency’s ability to agency to take bold measures in the mission. However, this may be limited by personal liabilities emanating from actions conducted within an official capacity which might in turn discourage agencies working in the program from being bold in the assigned tasks. This is an aspect that has negatively affected the realization of the program’s goals given that there are no clear provisions dealing with personal liability in its strategic as well as tactical processes (Stojkovic, Kalinich, & Klofas, 2015). Without this, implementing new priorities will not receive the full support of field officers.

Mobilization

In line with its new priorities considering he dynamic nature of terrorism, the agency has been able to mobilize as well as relocate substantial resources in addition to personnel to different counterterrorism agents and also support staff like translators and intelligence analysts. Further, the agency has incorporated fresh operational components into the program dedicated at achieving the overall mission. Each distinct component mirrors an innovative ability or augmented capacity in regards to war against terror. The success achieved in mobilization in not only indicative of the increase in number of personnel and program components, but also effective training and equipment with appropriate investigative tools to address the challenges posed by modern terrorism (Stojkovic, Kalinich, & Klofas, 2015).

Finally, mobilization has ensured that counterterrorism activities are the principle priorities for criminal justice department thus ensuring that personnel are available whenever a surge in operational capacity is needed.  This has also allowed the agency to develop standardized processes with a view to conducting adequate analysis as well as generating actionable intelligence that enhance the capacity of analysts to support the program. This assessment therefore notes that the flexibility in terms of leveraging as well as mobilizing its personnel in this way is imperative to the agency’s timely response to dynamic threats (Svendsen, 2015).

Evidence Exploitation

Before the 9/11 attack, the Federal Bureau of Investigations as well as its respective partners lacked adequate procedures for exploiting evidence in a systematic manner in order to acquire valuable intelligence. Based on this deficiency, the agency established the National Media Exploitation Center to coordinate inter-agency efforts relating to analysis and dissemination of information collected from different evidentially sources (Stojkovic, Kalinich, & Klofas, 2015). The center has enhanced the capacity of the agency to analyze evidence and so far the efforts have resulted in excess of twenty thousand credible leads including forensic evidence such as DNA profiling, ballistics, and fingerprints connected terrorists to potential threats (Svendsen, 2015).

The organization has proceeded to leverage this enhanced ability to develop specialized units charged with the responsibility of analyzing specific forms of information. This is facilitated by the Communication Exploitation Division create in 2001 with the primary goal of analysis of intelligence or evidence contained in electronic media, documents, electronic communication as well as forensic evidence (Rabkin, 2012).  Finally, the agency has advanced its evidence processing capabilities by creating the Terrorist Explosive Devices Analytical Center which has in turn enhanced coordination activities among multiple agencies in regards to collecting analyzing, conducting forensics and disseminating valuable intelligence relating to evolving terrorism methods especially the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). This has resulted in reduced threats of the use of IDS to attack Americans on the domestic as well as global front (Svendsen, 2015).

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Domestic intelligence can only achieve so much in detecting and averting terrorism threats. In this regard, the FBI in 2002 sought to increase its efforts in leveraging foreign intelligence as most threats are planned outside the country (Stojkovic, Kalinich, & Klofas, 2015).  Towards this end, it created the Office of General Counsel with a view to availing the requisite support in addition to streamlining functions relating to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance ACT process. Through this office, the agency has been able to realize this goal by ensuring that packages of the act are prepared and reviewed within a timely as well as consistent manner. Through this act, the agency has realized tremendous results in gathering foreign intelligence by working closely with foreign counterterrorism and intelligence units through a seamless communication process. The process is however predicated on reciprocity   as the flow of intelligence is two-way. This collaboration with foreign agencies has allowed the FBI to stay abreast with emerging as well evolving threats (Rabkin, 2012).

Conclusion

By reworking its strategic planning processes, the Federal Bureau of Investigations has developed a clear goals as well as objectives coupled with the necessary flexibility needed to enable it to adjust in a timely manner to dynamic threats. This has in turn transformed its goals in addition to objectives into measurable and actionable activities capable at tracking progress of the realization of respective goals. Further, the enhanced planning process has developed performance targets in addition to measures that have incrementally allowed the organization’s goals through comprehensive evaluations and timely implementation of recommendations. Towards this end, the assessment of the Federal Bureau of Investigations using the Goal Model has noted that the transformations realized this far through the Counterterrorism program has been tremendous but not to satisfactory levels. The agency still lacks comprehensive threat assessment criteria that are appropriately suited to detecting evolving threats. More should therefore be done in terms of developing an assessment matric that is responsive s opposed to being reactive as the as the essence of any counterterrorism activity is predicated on the ability to detect and stop different threats before they turn into a real1ity. The assessment also note that the realization of different goals especially in regards to executing new goals is hinder by personal liability emanating from actions conducted within an official capacity which might in turn discourage agencies working in the program from being bold in the assigned tasks. This is an aspect that has negatively affected the realization of the program’s goals given that there are no clear provisions dealing with personal liability in its strategic as well as tactical processes. Without this, implementing new priorities will not receive the full support of field officers and such; clear legislation should be established to address the same.

References

Odom, W. E. (2003). Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Rabkin, N. J. (2012). Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security. DIANE Publishing.

Stojkovic, S., Kalinich, D., & Klofas, J. (2015). Criminal Justice Organizations: Administration and Management. New York, NY: Cengage Learning.

Svendsen, A. (2015). The federal bureau of investigation and change: addressing US domestic counter-terrorism intelligence. Intelligence and national security, 23-45.